FILED

Hamid Assadian 22 Nerval Newport Beach, CA 92657 Ph. (949) 436-8494 Email: hrassadian@yahoo.com

DEC - 6 2013

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURTE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALEBRA

DEPUTY CLERK

HAMID ASSADIAN

Defendant PRO SE

• 1

2

3

4

5

7

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

WORDTECH SYSTEMS, INC., a California Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS, Inc. a Nevada corporation Corp. DBA INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS CORP. AKA INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS AKA INTEGRATED SYSTEMS AKA INTERNET NETWORK STORAGE COMPANY, AKA INSC; NASSER KHATEMI, an individual, HAMID ASSADIAN, an Individual, EHTERAM GHODSIAN, an individual, SHOHREH JAVADI, an individual, MICHAEL F. ELLSWORTH, an individual; BRIAN J. DEAN, an individual; SAN JUAN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; and DOES 1 – 50,

Defendants

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

Case No.: 2:04-CV-01971 TLN EFB

DEFENDANT ASSADIAN'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO REQUEST TO DISMISS THE PENDING ACTION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT BASED UPON IMPROPER VENUE PURSUANT TO [FRCP 12(B)(3)] and [28 U.S.C. 1400(B)]

Hearing Date: January 16, 2014

Time: 2:00 P.M.
Courtroom: 2, 15th Floor

Judge: Hon. TROY L. NUNLEY

Defendant Hamid Assadian (Defendant Assadian) provides the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion to request to dismiss the pending action based upon improper venue.

DEFENDANT Assadian's Motion to Request to dismiss the pending action based upon improper venue

2 3 4

l

Alternatively, if this Honorable Court does not wish to grant a dismissal of the case due to improper venue, Defendant Assadian requests this Honorable Court to transfer the case to the Central District of California where all remaining defendants reside. Defendant Assadian does not waive his rights as to the choice of venue by this special appearance and filing of this notice of a motion as well as the motion to dismiss the pending action in the Eastern District based upon improper venue.

Defendant Assadian hereby incorporates all documents on the docket for this referenced case as well as trial and session transcripts including but not limited to the Honorable Court's order dated 1/7/2005 (Doc. 21), Court's order dated 8/6/2012 (Doc. 448), and attached Declaration of Hamid Assadian In Support Of His Motion to Dismiss the Case Based Upon The Venue, in order to avoid repeated arguments and disclosures. Defendant Assadian hereby requests a Judicial Review of the above documents and their corresponding transcripts, and all of their respective attachments.

Defendant Assadian hereby seeks forgiveness for any possible errors and/or omission on his part for his Pro Se motion. Defendant Assadian has read what he has believed to be relevant Eastern District Rules and Procedures and assures this Court of his full and unconditional intent to follow the law and this Court's Rules and Procedures. As a Pro Se Defendant, Defendant Assadian relies on this Hon. Court for law and research so that the principals of fairness and justice can be upheld.

Defendant Assadian, a mere employee of a company (Defendant INSC which is now bankrupt), has suffered enough during the past nine years. Defendant Assadian has spent the past nine years of his life dealing with this case and is completely and unconditionally exhausted. Defendant Assadian sought an appeal to the US Court of Appeals so that he could move on with his life. Seeking justice has turned out to be a life-long teaching lesson and an ordeal that he would never forget. Now in its tenth year, and as soon as the "stay of proceeding" is terminated, Defendant Assadian requests from this Honorable Court to force Plaintiff Wordtech to obey the law and pursue all defendants for the new

trial that is ordered by the Honorable Court in the Central District of California where all defendants as

well as the majority of the witnesses reside. The people under the jurisdiction of the Eastern District

have done their part during the past nine years for Wordtech. Defendant Assadian believes that the

resources of the Eastern District should not be spent on the defendants who reside and have allegedly

committed illegal acts in the Central District of California. There is no relationship between the two

pending alleged charges of contributory infringement and inducement of infringement by all

defendants including Defendant Assadian and the Eastern District of California.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Wordtech Systems, Inc. has filed a lawsuit against many defendants including Defendant Assadian, a mere employee of the company, on September 22, 2004.

On January 7, 2005, the Honorable Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 21, Dated 1/7/2005, Defendant Assadian's Declaration Exhibit A). In its order, the Hon. Court stated "Indeed, when "the cause of action is personal to the individual defendant, the venue requirement must be met as to that defendant." Hoover, 84 f.3d at 1410." (Def. Assadian's Declaration Exhibit A, Page 3, Lines 6-8).

In its latest motion for termination of stay in proceedings, Plaintiff Wordtech Systems, Inc. has practically documented for the Honorable Court that this case does not belong in the Eastern District of California. Plaintiff Wordtech has provided a Proof of Service for the Defendants including Defendant Assadian (Def. Assadian's Declaration Exhibit C). All three Defendants in this NEW action reside in Orange County and therefore under the jurisdiction of Central District of California and not the Eastern District.

Wordtech admits that all defendants for the new trial are individuals (Wordtech's Proof of Service, Doc. 474 and Doc. 475, and Def. Assadian's Declaration Exhibit C).

Wordtech admits that all defendants are residents of Orange County, California, in the Central District (Wordtech's Proof of Service, Doc. 474 and Doc. 475).

Defendant Integrated Network Solutions Corporation (Defendant INSC) has completed its Chapter 7 bankruptcy as Plaintiff Wordtech has documented for this Hon. Court (Case no. 8:12-bk-20268-ES).

Defendant Assadian believes that the Honorable Judge Morris England's statement and order, Doc. 21, should control the venue now that only defendants who are individuals are involved in a NEW trial in a NEW court. In Doc. 21, dated 1/7/2005, Page 3, Lines 6-8, the Hon. Judge England stated:

"Indeed, when "the cause of action is personal to the individual defendant, the venue requirement must be met as to that defendant." Hoover, 84 f.3d at 1410."

ARGUMENT

Defendant Assadian presents the following memorandum of points and authorities with respect to a dismissal of the case in the Eastern District based upon improper venue. Alternatively, Defendant Assadian respectfully requests this Hon. Court to transfer the case to the Central District of California where all defendants and the majority of the witness including but not limited to all past INSC employees, officers and owners reside ((INSC has completed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceedings in the Central District of California).

Contrary to Plaintiff's Counsel Declaration, Defendant INSC's bankruptcy case is closed and a discharge is not applicable. In her declaration (Doc. 474-2), Declaration of Marilyn A. Harper In

DEFENDANT Assadian's Motion to Request to dismiss the pending action based upon improper venue

Support Of Motion For Termination Of Stay Proceedings, Page 1, Line 10, Wordtech's counsel misleads the court by indicating "This case [8:12-bk-20268-ES] was closed on 04/04/2013 discharge without". This case is closed and discharge is not applicable. Docket 7 of 8:12-bk-20268-ES case reads:

"Bankruptcy Case Closed – NO DISCHARGE, **Not Applicable.** Since it appears that no further matters are required that this case remain open, or that the jurisdiction of this Court continue, it is ordered that the Trustee is discharged, bond is exonerated, and the case is closed."

Furthermore, in its order dated 8/6/2012 (Doc. 448)the Hon. Court exonerated individuals including Defendant Assadian's liability for direct infringement but set a new trial for individual Defendants' liability for Contributory Infringement and for inducement of infringement. The Hon. Court's order reads (Defendant Assadian's Declaration Exhibit B, Doc. 448, Court's Order dated 8/6/2012, Page 7, Lines 3-5) as follows:

"These issues will not be tried now, nor, as a consequence, will the issue of the individual Defendants' liability for direct infringement."

Additionally,

In Doc. 448, Court's Order dated 8/6/2012, Page 9, Lines 15-18, it is stated:

"this case will be set for a new trial on the issues of the individual Defendants' liability for contributory infringement and for inducement of infringement"

VENUE STANDARD

In Court's order, Doc. 21, Page 2, the venue standard is well discussed. Defendant Assadian hereby incorporates this Court Order, Document 21, where it references 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) and clearly states:

"Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in [1] the judicial district where the defendant resides, or [2] where the defendant has committed acts of the infringement and has a regular and established place of business."

Defendant Assadian and the other defendants for the NEW trial all reside in the Central District of California as Wordtech has admitted and documented for the Honorable Court. The only proper venue for the pending and alleged charges against all defendants is therefore the Central District of California.

Furthermore, Plaintiff's Fist Amended Complaint filed on January 28, 2005 does not plead any facts regarding the residency of Defendant Assadian or any other remaining defendants. If Wordtech was to bring a new action against Defendant Assadian and/or other remaining Defendants, it would have been forced to do it in "a judicial district where any defendant resides if all of the defendants reside in the same state" (28 U.S.C. 1391). This is a NEW trial and in a NEW court and therefore Wordtech cannot claim a judicial economy either.

In this new trial, the alleged contributory infringement and inducement of infringement begin and end in the Central District where all defendants reside. There is no relationship with the Eastern District what-so-ever.

Alternatively, this Hon. Court is empowered to transfer the case to the Central District for the convenience of the parties and witnesses "in the interest of justice" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404 if this Court determines that the Eastern District is the proper venue. Defendant Assadian believes that the mere health and age condition of the owner of bankrupt INSC, Defendant Ghodsian, who should be approaching eighty years, should be a major factor in this Court's decision to transfer the case as an alternative. Defendant Assadian believes that Ms. Ghodsian would never be able to appear before the Hon. Court in Sacramento. The Court has wide discretion to transfer a case under Section 1404. In this

Section, the Court need not even determine whether venue is proper in the first place (See E.P.G.

Pespsico, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 1988 USD, Lexis 5322, 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) which states:

"The Court need not decide whether venue is properly placed in this District since, even if it were decided that the [defendant] is doing business in this District, this Court must find that venue should be transferred to the [Western District] for the reasons given below. Accordingly, the Court does not reach the [defendant's] motion for transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a)."

Furthermore, Section 1404 factors for the Court's consideration for the "interest of justice" is broad and as follows:

"(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents and the relative use if access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process of compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties...."

Each and every element of Section 1404 [1404(1) through 1404(9)] leaves the door open for his Hon. Court to transfer the case to the Central District if it decides not to dismiss the case in its entirely.

Plaintiff with its in-house Counsel, and two other senior attorneys and law firms are on one hand and three PRO SE defendants are on the other. Defendant Khatemi is already in Chapter 7 bankruptcy and based on the ruling of the Hon. Bankruptcy Court in the Central District of California and its appointed trustee, is insolvent. Defendant Ghodsian who has defaulted in the past is a lady approaching eighty years of age with many health issues. Defendant Assadian is exhausted physically with major heart conditions and financially dealing with this issue for the past nine years at exuberant cost and resources. The clear weight for Section 1404 (6), "the relative means of the parties", is indisputably in favor of defendants including Defendant Assadian for this Hon. Court to elect the Central District of California for the venue.

.

Defendant Assadian believes that now that a new trial is ordered on selected issues and the case is assigned to a new court and pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(3), as soon as the "stay of proceedings" are terminated, the case should be dismissed in the Eastern District so that Wordtech can pursuit the new trial in the district where the defendants reside if Wordtech desire so. This is a new trial in a new Court and as such Wordtech cannot claim judicial economy or being prejudiced.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Defendant Assadian hereby respectfully requests from this Court to dismiss the entire action in the Eastern District of California based on improper venue.

Alternatively, Defendant Assadian respectfully requests from this Court to transfer the above reference case to the Central District of California where all defendants reside so that the principals of fairness and justice can be upheld.

Date: December 5, 2013

Respectfully Submitted,

Defendant

HAMID ASSADIAN

ssallow

PRO SE

DEFENDANT Assadian's Motion to Request to dismiss the pending action based upon improper venue

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

2		
3	1, Jade Scarlett	, declare that I am a resident of the State of California.
4	I am over the age of eighteen years and I am NOT a party to this matter.	
5	My address is:	
6	My address is.	
7	Ace Attorney Service	
8	901 F Street, Suite 150	
9	Sacramento, CA 95814	
10		
11	On December 6, 2013, I served the attack	ned
12	DEFENDANT ASSADIAN MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO VENUE DEFENDANT ASSADIAN'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS	
13	DUE TO VENUE and ITS EXHIBIT A,	B, AND C.
14	On the following person, by placin	g a true convenciosed in a sealed envelone with first
15	II	
16	class postage fully prepaid in the United States Mail at WCMMINTO, California,	
17	addressed as follows:	
18	Marilyn A. Harper	Ehteram Ghodsian
19	2500 Dean Lesher Drive, Suite A	24961 Via Portola
20	Concord, CA 94520	Laguna Niguel, CA 92677
20		
21	Nasser Antonio Khatemi	
22	24961 Via Portola Laguna Niguel, CA 92677	
23	anguan raguos, Car 72011	

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

December (0, 2013, in Salramento, California,

24

25

26

27

28

POS - DEFENDANT Assadian's Motion to Request to dismiss the pending action based upon improper venue and Declaration of Def. Assadian in support of this motion and its exhibits.

1	Hamid Assadian 22 Nerval
2	Newport Beach, CA 92657
	Ph. (949) 436-8494
3	Email: hrassadian@yahoo.com
4	HAMID ASSADIAN
	Defendant
5	PRO SE
0	

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

WORDTECH SYSTEMS, INC., a California Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS, Inc. a Nevada corporation Corp. DBA INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS CORP. AKA INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS AKA INTEGRATED SYSTEMS AKA INTERNET NETWORK STORAGE COMPANY, AKA INSC; NASSER KHATEMI, an individual, HAMID ASSADIAN, an Individual, EHTERAM GHODSIAN, an individual, SHOHREH JAVADI, an individual, MICHAEL F. ELLSWORTH, an individual; BRIAN J. DEAN, an individual; SAN JUAN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; and DOES 1 – 50,

Defendants

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

Case No.: 2:04-CV-01971 TLN EFB

DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT
ASSADIAN IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION
TO DISMISS THE PENDING ACTION IN
THE EASTERN DISTRICT BASED UPON
IMPROPER VENUE

Hearing Date: January 16, 2014

Time:

2:00 P.M.

Courtroom: 2, 15th Floor

Judge: Hon. TROY L. NUNLEY

DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT ASSADIAN IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS THE PENDING ACTION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT BASED UPON IMPROPER VENUE

- 5 6
- 7
- 8
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13 14
- 15
- 16 17
- 18
- 19
- 20 21
- 22
- 23 24
- 25 26
- 27
- 28

- 1. I am a defendant in this action. I make this declaration in support of my Motion to
- Dismiss the Pending Action Due To Improper Venue.
- 2. I have lived in Orange County, California throughout my employment at Integrated Network Solutions Corporation (INSC) starting from 1997.
- 3. I have lived in the County of Orange during the period that Plaintiff Wordtech alleges that I have allegedly committed contributory infringement of its patents and induced infringement of its patents while employed by INSC.
 - 4. I have lived in Orange County California consistently from 1991 through present.
 - 5, I have never lived or worked in any area within the Eastern District of California,
 - 6. Attached Exhibit A is a true copy of the Court Order dated 1/7/2005.
 - Attached Exhibit B is a true copy of the Court Order dated 8/6/2012. 7.
- Attached Exhibit C is a true copy of Proof of Service that I have received from 8. Wordtech Systems reflecting that all defendants in the NEW action are residing in the County of Orange, in the Central District of California.
- Date: December 5, 2013
- Respectfully Submitted,
- HAMID ASSADIAN
- PRO SE

Court Order Dated 1/7/2005

EXHIBIT A

Case 2:04-cv-01971-TLN-EFB Document 21 Filed 01/07/05 Page 1 of 4

2

1

3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23 24

25 26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----00000----

WORDTECH SYSTEMS INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. S 04-1971 MCE PAN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS CORP. DBA INTEGRATED NETWORK AKA INTERNET NETWORK STORAGE

COMPANY, a Nevada corporation, NASSER KHATEMI, an individual, HAMID ASSADIAN, an individual, and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

----00000----

Defendants Integrated Network Solutions Corp. ("INSC"), Nasser Khatemi ("Khatemi"), and Hamid Assadian ("Assadian"), ask this Court to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiff Wordtech Systems Inc. ("Wordtech") based upon improper venue. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED. //

Case 2:04-cv-01971-TLN-EFB Document 21 Filed 01/07/05 Page 2 of 4

BACKGROUND

Wordtech filed its complaint on September 22, 2004, in the Eastern District of California. Wordtech alleges that Defendant INSC (a Nevada corporation) and Defendants Khatemi and Assadian (individual corporate employees residing in the Central District of California) infringed two of its patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 1,141,298 and 1,532,198. On December 30, 2004, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue.

STANDARD

Venue in patent cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. \S 1400(b), which states:

Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in [1] the judicial district where the defendant resides, or [2] where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). As to corporate defendants, the term "resides" is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which states that such a defendant resides in any district that it is subject to personal jurisdiction. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1580 (9th Cir. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), an alien corporation "may be sued in any district." VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1579.

 Venue with regard to "corporate employees charged with personal liability for acts taken as individuals, not as the

Case 2:04-cv-01971-TLN-EFB Document 21 Filed 01/07/05 Page 3 of 4

alter ego of the corporation, does not flow automatically to forums in which venue is proper as to the corporation." Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 f.3d 1408, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1996); cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco. Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (providing an example of a corporate alter eqo). Indeed, when "the cause of action is personal to the individual defendant, the venue requirement must be met as to that defendant." Hoover, 84 f.3d at 1410.

Finally, while a court may consider facts outside of the pleadings when addressing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure1 12(b)(3) motion, it is not required to do so, and, in its discretion, can require the parties to expressly plead all necessary information. Murphy v. Schneider National, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004); Hoover, 84 f.3d at 1410.

ANALYSIS

15 16

1

2

. 3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Venue is based on the facts alleged in a well-pled complaint. Hoover, 84 F.3d at 1410; see Dody v. Brown, 659 F. Supp. 541, 544 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1987); McGhan v. F.C. Hayer Co., 84 F. Supp 540, 541 (D. Minn 1949) (holding that the plaintiff must plead "ultimate facts that sufficiently allege venue so as to sustain the Court's jurisdiction").

In its complaint, Wordtech only addressed venue generally. (Pl's Compl. at 2:21-22; 4:16-20.) Notably, the complaint does not allege any facts regarding Defendants' relationship to the

Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a "Rule" or "Rules" are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case 2:04-cv-01971-TLN-EFB Document 21 Filed 01/07/05 Page 4 of 4

Eastern District of California. Consequently, the Court finds that Wordtech's complaint is insufficient to find the Eastern District as the proper venue in this case. <u>Hoover</u>, 84 f.3d at 1410; <u>McGhan</u>, 84 F.Supp at 541.

Accordingly, the Court has elected not to exercise its Rule 12(b)(3) discretion with respect to extra-pleading information. As such, in order to sustain the Eastern District of California as a proper venue, Wordtech must plead its basis for venue - as to each defendant - specifically within its complaint.

To date, Wordtech has failed to do so. Consequently, Defendant's motion is granted, and Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend its complaint and has 30 days from the date this order is filed to file an amended complaint with the Court.

~ ~

Wordtech 04-1971 wpd-

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend as specified above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: January 7, 2005

/S/ Morrison C. England, Jr. MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Court Order Dated 8/6/2012

-EXHIBIT B

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 1 of 9

1 /

24 |

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WORDTECH SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

.

INTEGRATED NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB

ORDER

Plaintiff Wordtech Systems, Inc. ("Wordtech"), filed this patent infringement action on September 22, 2004. A jury in this Court found Defendants Integrated Network Solutions, Inc. ("INSC"), Nasser Khatemi and Hamid Assadian (collectively, "Defendants") each liable to Wordtech for direct infringement, contributory infringement and inducement of infringement involving technology for automated duplication of compact discs. Defendants filed a post-trial motion for new trial, which was denied. As is relevant here, the individual Defendants appealed the liability verdicts against them, and all Defendants appealed the jury's verdict as to damages.

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 2 of 9

The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of Defendants' new trial motion and remanded to this Court. Presently before the Court is supplemental briefing filed by both Wordtech and individual Defendants, who are now proceeding pro se, regarding those issues to be tried on remand. For the following reasons, trial will be had on the issues of whether: 1) the individual Defendants are liable for contributory infringement; 2) the individual Defendants are liable for inducement of infringement; and 3) damages.

BACKGROUND1

In its operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Wordtech alleges that Defendants infringed three of its patents, which cover "Programmable Self-Operating Compact Disk Duplication Systems," by modifying and selling "Robocopiers." Robocopiers are disc duplication devices that copy video files from computers to multiple discs. According to Wordtech, INSC, Khatemi and Assadian, among others, directly and contributorily infringed Wordtech's patents and induced third parties to do the same.

At trial, Wordtech attempted to elicit testimony going to the validity of INSC as a corporation and to the issue of piercing the corporate veil. Defendants objected to that evidence as irrelevant, and the evidence was eventually excluded on the basis that Wordtech's arguments were not encompassed within the Court's Final Pretrial Order ("FPTO").

The following facts are taken primarily from <u>Wordtech</u> <u>Systems</u>, <u>Inc. v. INSC</u>, 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 3 of 9

In addition, prior to closing arguments, Plaintiff moved to amend its FAC to address "the identity of the corporation," and that motion was denied. Finally, Defendants addressed Wordtech's entity-related theories in their closing arguments, but the jury was not instructed on these issues.

At the close of the trial, the jury found Defendants liable on all infringement theories. The jury determined infringement of each patent was willful and awarded Wordtech a total of \$250,000 in damages. This Court subsequently found the case "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C. § 285, trebled damages, and awarded Wordtech attorneys' fees, interest and costs. Defendants thereafter filed motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure² and a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a), all of which were denied.

On appeal, the individual Defendants challenged the liability verdicts against them individually, and all Defendants challenged the jury's damages award. That court remanded for this Court to determine whether a new trial is warranted, stating as follows:

[W]e reverse the denial of [Defendants'] Rule 59(a) motion..., and remand for consideration of whether a new trial is warranted on their individual liability for direct infringement, inducement, and contributory infringement. On remand, the district court should address the issues of piercing INSC's corporate veil and INSC's corporate status, whether Wordtech preserved these arguments for trial, the law governing these issues and whatever jury instructions might be necessary.

///

27 Pall further references to "Rule" or "Rules" are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 4 of 9

Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1317-18. The circuit court also raised concerns as to whether a new trial should properly encompass Wordtech's inducement theory given that, though the verdict form made clear the parties intended the litigate the claim, the word "inducement" does not appear in the FPTO and the theory was not specifically argued by either side at trial nor was it included among the jury instructions.

On remand, this Court ordered supplemental briefing as to which of the issues identified by the Federal Circuit should be re-litigated. That supplemental briefing is complete. Having reviewed the parties' arguments, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court now holds that a new trial is required on the individual Defendants' liability for contributory infringement and inducement and on damages.

ANALYSIS

A. Direct Infringement.

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." "Title 35 authorizes a finding that an officer of a corporation is personally liable for the corporation's acts of infringement." Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intern., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

28 ///

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 5 of 9

1 "Personal liability under § 271(a), however, requires sufficient 2 evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil." Id. In order 3 to maintain a claim for direct infringement against corporate 4 officers for a corporation's infringement, Plaintiff must 5 therefore plead and prove, for example, that the corporate entity is a sham or that the corporate veil should be pierced to impose 6 7 liability on the individual Defendants. See, e.g., Timeline, 8 Inc. v. Proclarity Corp., 2006 WL 2038255, *3-4, n.1 (W.D. Wash.) 9 (dismissing direct infringement claims for failure to plead 10 grounds to justify piercing the corporate veil) (citing P.N.A. 11 Constr. Techs., Inc. v. McTech Group, Inc., 2006 WL 738721, *2 12 n.2 (N.D. Ga.); St. Paul Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 935 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 n.6 (D. Kan. 1996)). 13

The issue of whether the individual Defendants can be held liable under § 271(a) was not preserved for trial in this case because not only did Plaintiff not plead that INSC is a sham entity or that its corporate veil should be pierced for any reason, but that issue was also not included in the Court's Final Pretrial Order ("FPTO") as a disputed question. See FAC (ECF No. 22); ECF No. 157 (FPTO), 3:5-4:7. The Ninth Circuit has stated that:

Pretrial orders play a crucial role in implementing the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Unless pretrial orders are honored and enforced, the objectives of the pretrial conference to simplify issues and avoid unnecessary proof by obtaining admissions of fact will be jeopardized if not entirely nullified. Accordingly, a party need offer no proof at trial as to matters agreed to in the order, nor may a party offer evidence

or advance theories at the trial which are not included in the order or which contradict its terms.

2728

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 6 of 9

1 United States v. First Nat. Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d 882, 2 886 (9th Cir. 1981). Indeed, the Court in this case advised 3 the parties during the course of Plaintiff's case-in-chief 4 that issues not included within the FPTO would not be 5 litigated. See Trial Transcript (ECF No. 260), 30:24-37:14 6 (November 10, 2008). The Court further pointed out that the 7 FPTO can only be amended "to prevent manifest injustice." 8 Id. (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e)). No basis for 9 finding manifest injustice was presented during trial to 10 justify modifying the FPTO to include issues pertaining to 11 corporate validity, nor is any plausible argument presented 12 now. Accordingly, the Court now finds that Plaintiff waived 13 its right to attempt to pierce the corporate veil or, as a 14 consequence, to hold the individual Defendants' liable for 15 direct infringement.

The Court is cognizant that Plaintiff in this case believes the FPTO was amended by consent of the parties to conform to the proof offered at trial. Defendants, however, objected to the presentation of evidence going to corporate invalidity, Trial Transcript (ECF No. 258), 141:11-24 (November 4, 2008), and, as stated above, the Court clarified that issues not included in the FPTO would not be litigated, Trial Transcript (ECF No. 260), 30:24-37:14 (November 10, 2008). In keeping with the Court's ruling, the jury was not instructed on the corporate issues.

25 / ///

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

26 ///

27 | ///

28 ///

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 7 of 9

In sum, then, Defendants did not litigate by consent the issues of whether INSC was a sham entity or whether the corporate veil should be pierced.³ These issues will not be tried now, nor, as a consequence, will the issue of the individual Defendants' liability for direct infringement.

6

1

2

3

4

5

B. Contributory Infringement.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

7

According to the Federal Circuit, this Court's "legal error in presenting the contributory infringement issue to the jury requires a new trial." Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1317. Accordingly, the Court now finds that the issue of the individual Defendants' personal liability for contributory infringement must be retried.

15 //

16 ///

17 / //

18 ///

19 ///

20 ///

21 ///

23242526

27

28

The Court is also aware that Plaintiff takes issue with the Court's statement that the individual Defendants were still "on the line" despite the failure to include corporate validity issues as triable questions within the FPTO. Trial Transcript (ECF No. 60), 35:23-36:2 (November 10, 2008). The Court's statement, however, is entirely consistent with its rejection of Plaintiff's attempt to bring in the corporate issues at trial because the individual Defendants were still individually "on the line" for contributory infringement and for inducement without regard to the validity of the corporate structure. See, e.g., Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1316-17.

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 8 of 9

C. Inducement of Infringement.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Primarily based on the Federal Circuit's finding that "Wordtech's counsel confirmed [that] inducement was not raised in the Final Pretrial Order, in the jury instructions, or in the closing arguments," the appellate court remanded to this Court to determine whether a new trial should be had on the issue. Id. at 1316. The appellate court's assessment of the facts, however, is not entirely accurate.

First, Wordtech's counsel did confirm that the word "inducement" did not appear in the FPTO. Oral Arg. 27:42-28:16, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2009-1454.mp3. The Court finds, however, that, despite omission of the word "inducement," this theory of liability was nonetheless included within that Order. "A pretrial order...should be liberally construed to permit any issues at trial that are embraced within its language." Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the disputed factual issues incorporated within the FPTO were taken verbatim from the parties' Joint Pretrial Statement (ECF No. 154), which refers to all Defendants collectively as "INSC," and states that the parties will litigate whether "INSC has directly and contributorily infringed on the Patents-In-Suit under 35 U.S.C. §271(a), (b), (c) and/or (f)." Section 271(b) is the statutory section addressing inducement. Accordingly, the individual Defendants' liability for inducement was included within the FPTO.

///

Case 2:04-cv-01971-MCE-EFB Document 448 Filed 08/06/12 Page 9 of 9

Moreover, it was only through an apparent oversight that the jury did not receive a specific instruction on inducement. See
Wordtech Supplemental Brief (ECF No. 440), 8:2-3. Regardless,
the Court did instruct the jury that "Wordtech...argues that INSC,
Nasser Khatemi, and Hamid Assadian have contributed to and/or
actively induced the infringement of [the Patents]," and that
theory was included on the verdict form provided to the jury.
Trial Transcript (ECF No. 261), 97:8-11 (November 12, 2008).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the issue of inducement should
be re-litigated and a new trial on that theory should thus be
had.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this case will be set for a new trial on the issues of the individual Defendants' liability for contributory infringement and for inducement of infringement, as well as on damages. Not later than thirty (30) days following the date this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, the parties are directed to file a Joint Pretrial Statement. A new FPTO setting this matter for trial will issue thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2012

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Proof of Service by Wordtech

-EXHIBIT C